University of Florida Journal of Law & Public Policy
Volume 27

Issue 1

Article 3

2016

Affordable Care Act Fails for Lack of Uniformity
Hans G. Tanzler IV
Steven J. Willis

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/jlpp

Recommended Citation
Tanzler, Hans G. IV and Willis, Steven J. (2016) "Affordable Care Act Fails for Lack of Uniformity,"
University of Florida Journal of Law & Public Policy: Vol. 27: Iss. 1, Article 3.
Available at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/jlpp/vol27/iss1/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UF Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in University of Florida Journal of Law & Public Policy by an authorized editor of UF Law Scholarship
Repository. For more information, please contact kaleita@law.ufl.edu.

AFFORDABLE CARE ACT FAILS FOR
LACK OF UNIFORMITY
Steven J Willis* & Hans G. Tanzler IV**

I.

INTRODUCTION ............................................................................

II.

W HAT IS U NIFORM ITY 9 ................................

III.

82

. . . . . .. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84

A . Generally...........................................................................
B . Sp ecifically ........................................................................
1. Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. 1 (3 Dall.) (1796) .....
2. Edye v. Robertson, 112 U.S. 580 (1884) [Head
Money Cases] ...............................................................
3. Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41 (1900) ......................
4. Floridav. Mellon, 273 U.S. 12 (1927) .........................
5. Blanchette v. Connecticut General Insurance Corps.,
419 U.S. 102 (1974) [Regional Rail Reorganization
A ct C ases] ...................................................................
6. Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937) ......
7. United States v. Ptasynski, 462 U.S. 74 (1983) ............
C. Summary of Uniformity Factorsfor a
Close Exam ination............................................................

84
86
86

DOES UNIFORMITY APPLY TO THE ACA? .....................................

94
94

A. Why the Court Did Not Already Decide This? ...................
B. How ChiefJustice Roberts Showed Uniformity Applies to
Section 5000A ....................................................................
1. The Reference to Constitutional Requirements ...........
2. The Reference to Pollock .............................................
3. The Reliance on Hylton ...............................................
IV.

WHETHER THE

V.

87
89
90

91
92
92
93

96
96
98
98

5000A iS GEOGRAPHICALLY SUSPECT ................ 101

WHETHER THE SUSPECT SECTIONS PASS A CLOSE

U NIFORM ITY ANALYSIS .............................................................. 102

A . Analysis of Suspect Issues ....................................................
B. Hypothetical Non-Diverse, Non-Isolated,
Non-Uniform Taxpayers.......................................................
C. Conclusionson Uniformity ..................................................

102
103
108

Professor of Law, University of Florida Levin College of Law. Member, Florida Bar
and Louisiana Bar (inactive). Certified Public Accountant (Louisiana, certificate only, inactive
license).
** Member, Florida Bar. Certified Public Accountant (South Carolina, certificate only).
J.D. University of Florida. LL.M. University of Florida.
*

81

VI.

UNIVERST OFFLORIDA JOURNAL OF LA WAND PUBLIC POIdCY

[Vol. 27

CONGRESS OR THE STATES CAN REMEDY THE
UNIFORMITY PROBLEMS .............................................................

109

VII. C ONCLUSION ............................................................................... 109
I. INTRODUCTION

With the dust settled over hotly contested Commerce Clause,'
apportionment, 23 origination,3 and ambiguity 4 challenges to the
Affordable Care Act [ACA], 5 sober analysis reveals a remaining flaw:
the lack of uniformity.6 Whether by deliberate design or intuitive
happenstance, Justice Roberts-writing both in National Federation of
Independent Business v. Sebelius7 (NFIB) and in King v. Burwell8paved the way for a successful uniformity challenge. The Act's downfall
is not inevitable, as the lack of uniformity is reparable through legislative,
administrative, or state action.
We focus on one part of the Act9 :
1. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2584-93 (2012).
2. Id. at 2598-99.
3. Sissel v. HHS, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 760 F.3d 1, 10 (D.C. Cir. 2014)
(upholding the ACA under an origination challenge). But see Steven J. Willis & Hans G. Tanzler
IV, Reversed the Wrong House: Why 'Obamacare' Violates the US. Constitution's Origination
Clause 34-35) (Wash. Legal Found. Working Paper Series, Paper No. 189, 2015),
http://www.wlf.org/upload/legalstudies/workingpaper/WillisWPfinal.pdf.
4. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2496 (2015) (holding the I.R.C. section 36B credits
apply both in state and federally created exchanges).
5. For prior treatment of ACA challenges, see Steven J. Willis & Nakku Chung,
ConstitutionalDecapitationand Healthcare,TAX NOTES (Tax Analysts, Falls Church, Va.), July
12, 2010, at 169, 170; Erik M. Jensen, The Individual Mandate andthe Taxing Power, TAX NOTES
Jan. (Tax Analysts, Falls Church, Va.), Jan. 2, 2012, 96 at 97; see Erik M. Jensen, Post-NFIB:
Does the Taxing Clause Give Congress Unlimited Power?, TAX NOTES Sept.(Tax Analysts, Falls
Church, Va.), Sept. 10, 2012, at 1310; Timothy Sandefur, So It's a Tax, Now What??: Some of
the Problems Remaining After NFIB v. Sebelius, 17 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 203, 205 (2013); see
also Jeffrey S. Kinsler, Circuit-Specific Application of the Internal Revenue Code: An
UnconstitutionalTax, 81 DENV. U.L. REv. 113, 113 (2003) (not dealing with the Affordable Care
Act, but providing useful background).
6. David B. Rivkin, Jr. & Lee A. Casey, The Openingfor a Fresh ObamaCareChallenge,
WALL ST. J. 113 (Dec. 5, 2012), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324705104578
151164101375482.
7. Sebelius NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566, at 2577.
8. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. at 248.
9. Section 36B--the credit for lower income purchasers in state exchanges-also lacks
uniformity because it is a function of state-exchange silver-plan prices, which vary by state. See
I.R.C. § 36B(b) (2012). Further, eligibility for the credit is a function of the poverty line, which
varies among the states. See infra text accompanying note 13. Section 4980H-the employer
mandate-lacks uniformity because it is a function of section 36B credits, which themselves are
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Subsection 5000A(e) °0the individual mandate exception for low-income persons-lacks
uniformity in two respects. First, it is a function of state-exchange
bronze-plan prices, which vary from state to state. Second, it is a
function of the federally determined poverty level which varies
among Alaska, Hawaii, and the lower 48 states."I
non-uniform. See l.R.C. § 4980H(c)(3) (2012). Similarly section 4980D-inter alia, the
contraceptive mandate-was originally uniform when viewed in isolation. See I.R.C. § 4980D
(2012). But, starting in 2015, it works in conjunction with the employer mandate, which is not
uniform. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2762 (2014) (showing the
interaction between § 4980H and § 4980D). Thus, as applied, the 4980D excise is not uniform
beginning in 2015.
10. I.R.C. § 5000A(e) (2012).
II. The Department of Health and Human Services annually issues poverty guidelines. The
Bureau of the Census annually issues a poverty threshold. Liability for the tax is a function of
section 36B credit eligibility. I.R.C. § 5000A(e)(1)(B)(ii). Per I.R.C. section 36B, credit eligibility
for "applicable taxpayers" is a function of the HHS guidelines. I.R.C. § 36B(c)(i 1)(A) (2012). The
term "applicable taxpayer" means, with respect to any taxable year, a taxpayer whose household
income for the taxable year equals or exceeds 100% but does not exceed 400% of an amount equal
to the poverty line for a family of the size involved. Id. Per section 36B(d)(3)(A): "The term
'poverty line' has the meaning given that term in section 21 10(c)(5) of the Social Security Act
(42 U.S.C. i 397jj(c)(5))." Id. The Social Security Act, in turn, provides: "The term 'poverty line'
has the meaning given such term in section 673(2) of the Community Services Block Grant Act
(42 U.S.C. 9902(2)), including any revision required by such section." 42 U.S.C. § 1397jj(c)(5)
(2012). The Block Grant Act, in turn, provides:
The term "poverty line" means the official poverty line defined by the Office
of Management and Budget based on the most recent data available from the
Bureau of the Census. The Secretary shall revise annually (or at any shorter
interval the Secretary determines to be feasible and desirable) the poverty
line, which shall be used as a criterion of eligibility in the community services
block grant program established under this subtitle. The required revision
shall be accomplished by multiplying the official poverty line by the
percentage change in the Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers
during the annual or other interval immediately preceding the time at which
the revision is made. Whenever a State determines that it serves the objectives
of the block grant program established under this subtitle, the State may revise
the poverty line to not to exceed 125 percent of the official poverty line
otherwise applicable under this paragraph.
42 U.S.C. § 9902(2) (2012) (emphasis added). Whether the section 36B credit is a function of the
"official" poverty line or of the state-revised line is unclear. For uniformity analysis, each varies
among the states. Since 1966, the government has issued an "official" poverty line for Alaska,
another for Hawaii, and a third for the lower 48 states and the District. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., U.S. FEDERAL POVERTY GUIDELINES TO DETERMINE FINANCIAL ELIGIBILITY FOR
CERTAIN FEDERAL PROGRAMS 2-4 (2015). Thus, regardless which line the Exchanges use to
determine credit availability, the credit is a function of state lines and thus is geographically
suspect.
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II. WHAT IS UNIFORMITY?

A. Generally
Per Article I, Section 812:
The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties,
Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common
Defence and general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts
and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States;
Uniformity is a geographic limitation.' 3 Uniform taxes need not apply
to each person the same; thus, varying rates are acceptable. For example,
Congress constitutionally taxes large estates
at a higher rate than small
4
estates, and it excludes some altogether.'
The rate structure, however, must be the same in each state.' 5 For
example, Congress may tax truck tires differently than bicycle tires; but,
however it taxes truck tires, the specific truck tire rates must be the same
in every state. Hence, states with an abundance of bicycles might
legitimately receive favorable treatment as compared to states with an
abundance of trucks.
During the constitutional convention, states with much land and many
people worried that smaller states might impose capitations and land
taxes-both direct-and thus disadvantage them; hence, the direct tax
apportionment 6 requirement arose. Similarly, states worried about being
singled out by others, either individually or as groups; hence, the indirect
tax uniformity 7 requirement arose.
Whether Congress might tax an item that exists solely in one state but
not in another is uncertain. Congress can tax umbrellas-or the use of
umbrellas-even though they are more commonly used in Seattle than in
Phoenix. But, whether Congress may tax the use of snowmobilesperhaps common in Maine but non-existent in Florida-is less clear.
Certainly, Congress can tax specific products differently, even if the

12. U.S. CONST. art. 1,§ 8, cl. 1.
13. Charles C. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 583 (1937); Flint v. Stone Tracy
Co., 220 U.S. 107, 158 (1911); Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 86 (1900).
14. Knowlton, 178 U.S. at 110 (upholding the estate tax with varying rates).
15. Arguably uniformity must exist among the States, but not the District of Columbia. See
Knowlton, 178 U.S. at 107. That issue depends upon whether the reference to "the United States"
refers to the nation as a unit or to the various States as separate sovereigns. Id. The Knowlton
Court considered the issue but did not decide it because the statute in question applied uniformly
to all the states as well as to the District. Id.
16. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. 3; U.S. CONST. art. 1,§ 9, ci. 4.
17. Kinsler, supra note 5, at 126-27.
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state-by-state impact is non-uniform. 18
9
In contrast, direct tax apportionment commands a state-by-state
uniform result per capita, as opposed to a uniform rate. The section
20
5000A tax on the lack of health insurance fails the apportionment test;
however the Supreme Court decided the provision is not "any recognized
[category] ... of direct tax." 2 1 As a result it need not be apportioned.
Whether it must be uniform is a separate issue.
Facially, the Constitution applies uniformity to duties, excises, and
imposts. The distinctions between duties, excises, and imposts are not
clear. Generally imposts are levies on imports.2 2 But, in many instances,
so are duties, such as a duty on imported goods. The Supreme Court has
referred to the estate tax-generally thought to be an excise-as a death
duty.23 Similarly, the Court's Hylton24 decision held a tax on the use of
carriages-what would seem to be an excise-to be a duty. More
recently, the D.C. Circuit spoke of excises as applying to transactions, the
use of property, or to the exercise of a privilege.2256 For the discussion
herein, however, the distinctions are not important.
The Federalist Papers spoke of taxes as being either direct or
indirect.27 That distinction, however, does not appear in the Constitution.
18. United States v. Ptasynski, 462 U.S. 74, 85-86 (1983) (taxing profits from the sale of
Arctic oil differently from profits derived from the sale of other types of oil). Significantly, the
Ptasynski statute did not tax the Arctic oil differently from oil produced in other states; instead, it
taxed the sale of the Arctic oil differently. See id at 76-78. The sales could occur in any state. See

id.
19. Apportionment applies to states, omitting the District of Columbia. See U.S. CONST.
1,
§ 2, cl.3. Uniformity, in contrast, applies throughout the "United States," which arguablyart.
would include the District of Columbia. See Knowlton, 178 U.S. at 107.
20. Willis & Chung, supra note 5, at 193.
21. NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S.Ct. 2566, 2599 (2012).
22.

1 WESTEL WOODBURY WILLOUGHBY, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED

STATES 582 (1910).

23. Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 47 (1900); Young Men's Christian Ass'n of
Columbus, Ohio v. Davis, 264 U.S. 47, 50 (1924).
24. Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. 171, 175 (1796).
25. Murphy v. I.R.S., 493 F.3d 170, 184-85 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (discussing Bromley v.
McCaughn, 280 U.S. 124 (1929)).
26. "Whether the tax is to be classified as an 'excise' is in truth not of critical importance.
If not that, it is an 'impost"' "or a 'duty ... ' Charles C. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S.
548, 581-82 (1937) (citations omitted).
27.

THE FEDERALIST No. 36, at 485 (Alexander Hamilton) (1788).

The taxes intended to be comprised under the general denomination of internal
taxes, may be subdivided into those of the direct and those of the indirect kind.
Though the objection be made to both, yet the reasoning upon it seems to be
confined to the former branch. And indeed, as to the latter, by which must be
understood duties and excises on articles of consumption ....
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Instead the Constitution twice speaks of direct taxes, which must be
apportioned. 8 It broadly speaks of the taxing power, along with the
spending power, which must be "for ... the general [we]lfare. ' 9 It then
requires duties, imposts, and excises to be uniform. Arguably, while
duties, imposts and excises are all indirect, they do not comprise the
universe of indirect taxes. 30 Arguably, Congress may impose a tax that is
subject neither to uniformity nor apportionment. While that view may be
rarely held, it is worth considering as it impacts the relevance of
uniformity to section 5000A.
The Constitution is substantially about the taxing power: the Articles
of Confederation failed, at least in part, because Congress had no power
to tax. States naturally focused on that new power. Initially, the
Constitution's drafts required "uniformuniform[ity] and equal[ity]" for
32
excises, duties and imposts. 3 1 Later, that changed merely to "uniform.,
Equality was not required as the cases correctly note. 33 Nevertheless, the
central importance of the taxing power to the Constitution suggests
modem analysis not simply ignore apportionment and uniformity as
antiquated restrictions.
B. Specifically
Although many cases have dealt with uniformity, several stand out.
1. Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. 1 (3 Dall.) (1796)
Hylton primarily dealt with the direct tax apportionment requirement.
It held a tax on the use of carriages to be indirect34 and thus subject to
uniformity, which it satisfied, 35 rather than apportionment. The decision
provided little guidance on the meaning of "uniform"; however, each of
the justices speculated on the reach of the restriction. The Constitution,
unlike the Federalist Papers, spoke of a general power to tax and then
imposed apportionment on direct taxes and uniformity on excises, duties,
and imposts. Could that mean some other type of tax-not direct, but also
not a duty, excise or impost-be imposed by Congress?
Id.
28. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. 3; U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 4.
29. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
30. Hyiton v. United States, 3 U.S. 171, 173 (1796).
31. Jeffrey S. Kinsler, Circuit-Specific Application of the Internal Revenue Code: An
UnconstitutionalTax, 81 DENy. U. L. REV. 113, 127 (2003).
32. Apparently James Madison handwrote the word "uniform" into a draft after the prior
phrase "equal and uniform" had been omitted. Id.
33. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Tr. Co., 157 U.S. 429, 595 (1895).
34. Hylton, 3 U.S. at 175 (Chase, J.).
35. Id. at 7177-78 (Paterson, J.).
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Yes, answered all three Justices who participated significantly.3 6 Two
concluded such a tax would have to be uniform. The third essentially
37
punted, remarking that it might or might not be subject to the rule.
Hylton is important for the ACA analysis because:
38
* NFIB held the 5000A penalty to be a tax.
" NFIC held the 5000A tax not to be "any [kind]... of direct
tax,"" which suggests it is indirect.
* Per Hylton, an indirect tax must be uniform.
* Thus, the 5000A tax must be uniform.

2. Edye v. Robertson, 112 U.S. 580 (1884) [Head Money Cases]
Edye did not involve a tax, 40 but the Court nevertheless considered the
taxing power's "uniformity" limitation seriously. Congress enacted a
charge on ships carrying immigrants to ports. It treated all ports the same,
as required by the Constitution's ports clause. 41 The charge, however,
only applied to immigration through ports and not to inland immigration
methods such as rail; hence, it affected coastal states differently from how
& Iredell, J. respectively). Justice
Paterson, J.,
(at 4, 8, 10 (174, 180, 183 (Chase, J.,
36. Id.
and Justice Cushing declined to
others
with
the
agreeing
opinion
two-sentence
Wilson wrote a
write an opinion. Id.at 183-84.
37. Id.at 4175 (Chase, J.).
38. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2598, 2601 (2012).
39. Id. at 2599.
40. The Court had three significant statements regarding the ultimate nature of the charge:
"The tax in this case, which, as far as it can be called a tax, is an excise duty on the business of bringing
passengers from foreign countries into this, by ocean navigation" Edye v. Robertson, 112 U.S. 580,
594 (1884); "But the true answer to all these objections is that the power exercised in this instance
is not the taxing power. The burden imposed on the ship owner by this statute is the mere incident
of the regulation of commerce" Id at 595.
The sum demanded of him is not, therefore, strictly speaking, a tax or duty within
the meaning of the Constitution. The money thus raised, though paid into the
Treasury, is appropriated in advance to the uses of the statute, and does not go to
the general support of the government.
Id at 595-96. The third point-about the funds not accruing to the general treasury-foreshadowed
Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U.S. 196, 203 (1897)
the "dedication test" later adopted in Twin City Nat 'l
(holding that a bill to raise dedicated funds was not a bill for raising revenue for purposes of the
Constitution's origination clause). "All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of
Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with Amendments as on other Bills." U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 7, cl.I.
41. U.S. CONST. art. 1,§ 9, cl.6 "no preference("No Preference shall be given by any
Edye, 112
Regulation of Commerce or Revenue to the Ports of one State over those of another .. ");
U.S. at 594-95.
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it affected land-locked states. The Court approved the charge as an
appropriate and essential power belonging to Congress: somebody
needed to regulate the large number of often poor and ill persons arriving
through ports. 42 The states did not have the power;43 hence, it must belong
to Congress. The Court also found it consistent
with the regulation of
45
commerce 44 as well as with numerous treaties.

Although Eyde held the charge not to be a tax, it nevertheless found it
to be sufficiently uniform, stressing how the tax treated all ports
uniformly and how the problems addressed did not exist in states without
ports. The Court, in detail, described how the problems associated with
46
immigration via ships differed substantially from other immigration.
The tax is uniform when it operates with the same force and effect in
every place where the subject of it is found.4 7
The Court also explained that "perfect" uniformity is unnecessary:
Perfect uniformity and perfect equality of taxation, in all the aspects
in which the human mind can view it, is a baseless dream, as this
court has said more than once. State Railroad Tax Cases, 92 U.S.
575, 612. Here there is substantial uniformity within the meaning
and purpose of the [C]onstitution.48
Thus "substantial" uniformity is sufficient, which suggests widespread
non-uniformity would be fatal. Also, taxes are uniform even if the object
of the tax is found or occurs only in some states.49
Edye is important for the ACA analysis because:

42. Edye, 112 U.S. at 595 (considering that if neither the states nor Congress had the power
to impose the port charge, then the power "does not exist at all,"-a result the Court ridiculed.).
43.
44.
45.

Henderson v. Mayor of N.Y., 92 U.S. 259, 270 (1875).
Edye, 112U.S. at595.
Id. at 597.

46. Id. at 591 (describing how ship passengers might arrive diseased and starving). The
Court explained:, "[T]he evil to be remedied by this legislation has no existence on our inland
borders, and immigration in that quarter needed no such regulation." Id at 595.
47. Id. at 594.
48.

Id at 595. The State Railroad Tax Cases involved the uniformity requirement of the

Illinois Constitution. State Railroad Tax Cases, 92 U.S. 575 (1875).
49. The Court in Edye did not resolve whether a tax could be uniform if the object
of tax existed in a single state, especially if the state were "targeted" by the tax. See
Edye, 112 U.S. 580; Willis & Chung, supra note 5. Edye involved a naturally-occurring

aspect of the affected states-a coastline with ports. See Edye, 112 U.S. 580. Arguably,
the Court could reach a different conclusion with regard to taxes affecting state
decisions. See id.

AFFORDABLE CARE ACT FAILS FOR LACK OF UNIFORMITY

*

*

The object of the section 5000A tax - the failure of a taxpayer to
purchase "minimum essential coverage" for health care - can occur
in all states.
Section 5000A appears to lack "substantial uniformity" because two
of its functions vary widely: the price of bronze plans vary from
exchange to exchange and from state to state (as the requirement of
community rating 5° essentially commands) and the poverty line
varies from Alaska to Hawaii and from those states to the "lower
48." 51

3. Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41 (1900)
Knowlton found the estate tax constitutional as a uniform duty or
excise, although it had varying rates. 52 The decision, at great length,
discussed the differences between intrinsic uniformity and geographic
uniformity. 53 It held the U.S. Constitution merely requires geographic
uniformity. Many states had requirements of taxes being "equal" as well
as uniform. The Court distinguished these laws, finding no constitutional
requirement of "equality," which it described as "intrinsic."5 4 Some
important statements in the case were:
[W]hat the Constitution commands is the imposition of a tax by
the rule of geographical uniformity, not that in order to levy such
must be selected which exist uniformly in the several
a tax objects
55
states.
The commands of the Constitution in this, as in all other respects,
must be obeyed; direct taxes must be apportioned, while indirect
taxes must be uniform throughout the United States.5 6
50.

42 U.S.C. § 300gg-l(a) requires a modified community rating, which varies by state.

King v. Burwell, 483135135 S. Ct. 2480, 2486 (2015).); Kyle Pomerleau, A Redistributional
Effect of Obamacare, TAX FOUNDATION (May 30, 2013), http://taxfoundation.org/blog/

redistributional-effect-obamacare.
51. See supra text accompanying note 13. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 583
(1937); Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107, 158 (1920); Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 85-

86(1900).
52.

Knowlton, 178 U.S. at 110.

53. Id.at 84-85.
54. Id. at 84, 88, 98. Intrinsic uniformity would require each person be subject to the same
at 84-85.
amounts, somewhat akin to apportionment. Id.
55. Id. at 108 (emphasizing geographic uniformity).
56. Id.at 82-83 (quoting Nicol v. Ames, 173 U.S. 509, 515 (1898)). Nicol held: "Whether
the word 'uniform' is to be understood in what has been termed its 'geographical' sense, or as
meaning uniformity as to all the taxpayers similarly situated with regard to the subject-matter of
the tax, we think this tax is valid, within either meaning of the term." Nicol, 173 U.S. at 521. Of
significance, Knowlton referred to indirect taxes in relation to uniformity, not merely duties,
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That the words "uniform throughout the United States" do not
relate to the inherent character of the tax as respects its operation
on individuals, but simply requires that whatever plan or method
Congress adopts for laying the tax in question, the same plan and
the same method must be made operative throughout the United
States; that is to say, that wherever a subject is taxed anywhere, the
same must be taxed
everywhere throughout the United States, and
57
at the same rate.
Giving to the term uniformity as applied to duties, imposts and
excises a geographical significance, likewise causes that provision
to look to the forbidding of discrimination as between the states,
by the levying of duties, imposts, or excises upon a particular
subject in one state and a different duty, impost, or excise on the
same subject in another; and therefore, as far as may be, is a
restriction in the same direction and in harmony with the
requirement of apportionment of direct taxes.58
Knowlton is important for the ACA analysis for two main reasons:
* First, it emphasizes that indirect taxes - such as the section
5000A tax - must be uniform.
* Second, it not only emphasizes geographic uniformity, but
also the importance that similarly situated taxpayers be treated
similarly. Yet, as shown below, the ACA treats very similar
taxpayers differently in cases where the only important
distinction is a state political boundary.
4. Floridav. Mellon, 273 U.S. 12 (1927)
Florida objected to an estate tax that strongly favored states with an
inheritance tax, which Florida forbade in its constitution. 59 Florida
asserted two claims. First, the state would lose revenue because the law
would cause wealthy citizens to leave. Second, the state asserted, on
behalf of its citizens, the lack of uniformity in the tax. The Court ruled
imposts, and excises. Knowlton, 178 U.S. at 83.
57. Knowlton, 178 U.S. at 84. Thus, the tax can impact people differently, but the rate
structure must be the same everywhere. As explained below, the ACA rate structure varies by the
local bronze plan costs and state-specific poverty lines.
58. Id. at 89. The ACA violates this language. The subject of the tax does not vary from
state to state, but the tax does because it varies by state-specific factors: bronze plan prices and
poverty lines.
59. Florida v. Mellon, 271 U.S. 12, 15 (1927).
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against both claims on procedural grounds rather than on the merits. The
Court held Florida had yet to suffer any harm, essentially finding its facial
challenge premature, but held out the possibility of an as applied
challenge. The Court also held Florida lacked standing to represent the
interests of its citizens on their uniformity claim. 60 Significant dicta
stated:
The contention that the federal tax is not uniform, because other
states impose inheritance taxes while Florida does not, is without
merit. Congress cannot accommodate its legislation to the
conflicting or dissimilar laws of the several states, nor control the
diverse conditions to be found in the various states, which
necessarily work unlike results from the enforcement of the same
tax. All that the Constitution (article 1, s 8, cl. 1) requires is that
the law shall be uniform in the sense that by its provisions the6 1rule
of liability shall be the same in all parts of the United States.
Mellon is important for the ACA analysis because it approves of taxes
that lack uniformity because of "diverse conditions" in the states. This
aspect is inapplicable to the two issues discussed herein: the ACA taxing
differences are due to arbitrary state boundaries and differing federal
62
poverty measurement levels rather than diverse or changing conditions.
5. Blanchette v. Connecticut General Insurance Corps., 419 U.S. 102
(1974) [Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases]
The Regional Rail cases arose from a series of railroad company
bankruptcies. The uniformity challenge was ancillary to the underlying
cause of action and derived
from a separate section of the Constitution
63
dealing with bankruptcies.
The analysis the Court gave was the same later enunciated in
Ptasynski: the Constitution is inherently flexible and does not deny
Congress the ability "to fashion legislation to resolve geographically
isolated problems." 64 Furthermore the railroad industry in and of itself
60.

Id.at 16-17.

61. Id.at 19.
62. The poverty rule results from an arbitrary federal decision to classify Hawaii and
Alaska separately. See U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, GAO-10-240R, Opinion Letter on
Poverty Determination in U.S. Insular Areas (Nov. 10, 2009). Silver and Bronze plan prices may
result from diverse conditions between rural and urban, low cost and high cost areas; however,
the exchanges draw those lines at state borders rather than in actually changed conditions areas.
See Mellon, 273 U.S. at 17.
63. U.S. CONST. art. 1,§ 8, cl.4 ("To establish ...uniform Laws on the subject of
Bankruptcies throughout the United States.").
64. Blanchette v. Conn. Gen. Ins. Corps., 419 U.S. 102, 159 (1974).
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presents its own challenges, which require flexibility.
The case is important to the ACA analysis precisely because of its
carved-out exception to the uniformity limitation: for "geographically
isolated problems." As shown below, the ACA taxes residents of
neighboring counties differently, despite the utter lack of any noticeable
geographic differences.
6. Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937)
Steward Machine was a broad attack on the Social Security tax which
the Court upheld 5-4.65 While it did not add anything new to the
uniformity picture it confirmed previous jurisprudence, notably
Knowlton and Mellon. First, it confirmed from Knowlton that uniformity
is geographic and not intrinsic: the tax must have the same possible force
and effect geographically rather than resulting in the same amount
everywhere. 66 Second, it confirmed the Mellon language
that the "rule of
67
liability shall be alike in all parts of the United States."
7. United States v. Ptasynski, 462 U.S. 74 (1983)
Ptasynski is a difficult yet important decision. It was a uniformity
challenge on the Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act,68 which taxed
"windfall" gains on oil from "old" oil production sites. Congress passed
the Act following the deregulation of domestic oil prices. The goal of
deregulation was to encourage new domestic oil exploration; in response,
Congress sought to cap revenues in excess of pre price-control levels. The
Act exempted oil produced in commercial quantities north of the Arctic
Circle or at least 75 miles from the nearest Trans-Alaskan Pipeline
System. Most of the exempted oil was from Alaska, but much taxable oil
was also from Alaska.
Unanimously, the Supreme Court held that the tax passed a uniformity
challenge. According to the Court, the exemption was not drawn on state
65. Chas C. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937). Neither of the dissents
found the tax non-uniform. Id.at 610-18.
66. Id.at 583. The Court cited seven cases supporting the requirement of geographic
uniformity: "The tax being an excise, its imposition must conform to the canon of uniformity.
There has been no departure from this requirement. According to the settled doctrine, the
uniformity exacted is geographical, not intrinsic." Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 83 (1900);
Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107, 158 (1911); Billings v. United States, 232 U.S. 261, 282;
Stellwagen v. Clum, 245 U.S. 605, 613; LaBelle Iron Works v. United States, 256 U.S. 377, 392;
Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101, 117; Wright v. Vinton Branch of Mountain Trust Bank (Mar. 29,
1937) 300 U.S. 440.
67. Id.
68. See I.R.C. §§ 4986-91 (1980), repealed 1988. P.L. 100-418, tit. I, § 1941a), 102 Stat.
1322; United States v. Ptasynski, 462 U.S. 74 (1983).
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political lines but rather reflected Congress's consideration of the harsh
climate and geographic conditions in northern Alaska, which greatly
increased production costs. The Court noted that some offshore oil with
similar conditions was also exempt; hence, the distinction was not purely
on state boundaries. The Court also emphasized the tax was a function of
the "type" of oil, which is consistent with Congress' ability to tax
different products differently.
Although not emphasized by the Court, an important issue involved
placement of the tax. It was not a tax on the oil; instead, it was a tax on
the first sale of the oil, which applied whether the seller was in any of the
fifty states.69 In contrast, the section 5000A tax applies to persons who
lack health insurance and is a function of where those taxpayers reside.
Much of the opinion traced the history of the uniformity requirement
and the cases construing it, with the Court emphasizing the need for
geographic uniformity, "substantial uniformity" and the ability of
Congress to deal with "isolated" problems. The Court framed the
question as whether Congress could define the object of a tax using
geographic terms. The Court held such a definition to be permissible
because Congress could have defined the oil classes based on intrinsic
qualities rather than geographic.
In relation to the section 5000A tax, that explanation is critical. The
artic oil differed from other oil because of its nature, not simply its
geographic source.
The Court made two important additions to the uniformity puzzle.
When Congress uses geographic terms to address the subject of the tax,
the Court will examine the tax "closely" to see if actual geographic
discrimination results. The Court also emphasized "indirect"70taxes-as
opposed with excises, duties, and imposts-must be uniform.
C. Summary of Uniformity Factorsfor a Close Examination
Uniformity analysis is not easily reducible to black-letter rules;
nevertheless, some such rules emerge. They are:
69. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, CRUDE OIL WINDFALL PROFITS TAX ACT OF 1980, H.R.
REP. No 96-304, at 39 (1980).
The Act generally imposes the windfall profit tax on the first sale of taxable crude
oil and requires payment of the tax by the producer. The tax is to be withheld by
the first purchaser of the oil and deposited with the Treasury by him. The Act
generally defines the producer as the owner of the economic interest in the oil
and thus places the burden of the windfall tax on the persons who will receive
the increased income resulting from decontrol and OPEC price increases.

Id.
70.

United States v. Ptasynski, 462 U.S. 74, 80 n.9 (1983).
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1. Tax rates may vary by the object's value or the taxpayer's income so
long as the rates are nationally uniform.
2. Taxes may apply differently to different transactions or objects so
long as the transaction or object is subject to the same rates nationally.
They may apply to specific transactions/objects that occur or exist in
varying amounts - or not at all - in different states. For example, port
immigration only occurs in states with ports.
3. Taxes and rates may vary if based on physical geography, such as
coastlines and frigid conditions; however, such variations necessitate
a particularly close examination.
4. Taxes and rates may vary because of isolated problems or conditions.
How isolated the problem must be and what level ofjustification must
exist for non-uniformity is unclear.
5. Taxes and rates may vary because of "diverse conditions." What
constitutes "diverse conditions" is unclear. This rule is mere dictaand
has never formed the holding of any appellate decision.
In summary, taxes and rates may not vary solely because of state
boundaries, unless accompanied by isolated problems, diverse
conditions, or material physical geographical differences (such as a
coastline or frigid, harsh conditions).
III. DOES UNIFORMITY APPLY TO THE ACA?

The general provisions of section 5000A are facially uniform. The low
income exception, however, is not. Before a court can reach that issue it
must first resolve whether the uniformity requirement is relevant. For this
analysis, Justice Roberts' NFIB opinion is particularly instructive.
A. Why the Court Did Not Already Decide This?
Why the Court did not already resolve this issue: after all, it already
litigated the constitutionality of section 5000A, did it not? The answer is
no, not fully: it appropriately did not consider uniformity because the
issue was not then ripe. The Commerce Clause and apportionment
challenges-both unsuccessful-were facial challenges. In contrast, the
question of uniformity is an as applied challenge. Facially, subsection
5000A(e) appears non-uniform because it varies as a function of state-
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72
exchange bronze-plan prices.7 Because those prices differ, the section

is not uniform. That, however, requires a factual finding regarding the
prices, which did not exist until October 1, 2013, the launch date of the
exchanges. 73 Further, state exchanges--or federally created exchanges
for states that opt out of creating exchanges-first sold insurance to be
effective in 2014;74 the factual finding required further delay. The tax on

individuals who lack insurance accrues monthly, but requires a threemonth period of no insurance.7 5 Thus it could not apply until April 2014.
Further, individuals must report and pay the tax annually, 76 which further
delayed the facts needed to demonstrate uniformity or lack thereof:

jurisdiction over a refund claim, notice of deficiency, or civil suit
regarding the tax was not available until after the filing of 2014 tax
returns, which would be during 2015. 7 7
Congress designed the exchanges to use community rating and thus
area-based pricing. 78 It also imposed a tax that varies as the area pricing
varies . 79 The lack of uniformity appears intentional. Nevertheless, it was
not inevitable; the 2011 Court properly could not decide the issue without
facts, and the critical facts showing a lack of uniformity could not exist
until 2015.80

Also, Congress might have amended the statute to eliminate the
apparent lack of uniformity: it could make the section 5000A(e)
71. See I.R.C. § 5000A(e)(I)(b)(ii)(2012).
72. The federal government operates a web site that determines the "lowest cost bronze
plan" available for each state. See 2015 Health Coverage & Your Federal Taxes,
HEALTHCARE.GOV, https://www.healthcare.gov/taxes/ (last visited Feb. 8, 2016) [hereinafter
Health Coverage Tax Tool].
73. Patrick Mortiere, Timeline of Botched ObamaCareRollout, THE HILL (Nov. 15, 2013,
http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/1 90485-timeline-of-botchedPM),
9:53
implementation-of-obamacare.
74. Julie Rovner, So What's the Real Deadlinefor ObamacareSign-Up?, NPR (Oct. 14,
2013, 3:22 AM), http://www.npr.org/sections/ health-shots/2013/10/14/231462087/so-whats-thereal-deadline-for-obamacare-sign-up.
75. I.R.C. § 5000A(e)(4)(A) (2012).
76. I.R.C. § 5000A(b)(2) (2012).
77. Per I.R.C. § 5000A(c)(2)(B)(i)(2012), the 2014 penalty was a function of the taxpayer's
income for the year beginning in 2014; hence, that function could not be known until December
31, 2014 at the earliest, or later for taxpayers with a fiscal year. The tax would then not be paid
until the taxpayer filed the 2014 income tax return, which would normally be by April 15, 2015.
78. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg(a)(I), (2) (2012).
79. I.R.C. § 500OA(e)(1)(b)(ii) (2012).
80. See King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480(2015). All bronze plans could have had the same
prices. As of October 1, 2013, they did not; however, the Court would have required a crystal ball
to know that in 2011. Or, all fifty states could have formed a compact for uniform pricing.
Insurance companies, in a massive anti-trust violation, could have priced their products uniformly
in each exchange. Further still, the federal government could have created a single national
exchange with uniform pricing; after all, it ultimately created 36 exchanges, though it used
different pricing.
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exception a function of the national average for bronze plans. However
unlikely such an amendment may appear, it would cure much of the
uniformity problem. In 2011, the Court had no way of knowing whether
Congress might consider such an amendment. Indeed, Congress amended
and repealed parts of section 5000A in March 2010.81 Those parts
originally caused the tax to be a direct function of the poverty line in the
state in which the taxpayer resided. Because those lines vary between
Alaska, Hawaii, and the lower forty-eight states, the original tax
contained an additional uniformity violation. The 2010 amendment
changed section 5000A(e) function to the more general taxpayer "filing
requirement," which is uniform throughout the country. Thus the original
tax appeared to lack uniformity for three reasons: the poverty line
variation, the bronze plan variation, and the credit availability variation.
After the amendment, it lacks uniformity for only the latter two reasons.
At the time of the 2011 NFIB facial challenge, the Court had no way of
knowing whether Congress might also repeal or amend the other two
problems before a facial challenge with non-uniform facts became ripe in
2015.
B. How ChiefJustice Roberts Showed Uniformity Applies to
Section 5000A
Although the Roberts NFIB opinion properly did not deal with
uniformity directly, it referred to the requirement indirectly. Several parts
of the opinion demonstrate this point. Collectively, they appear to be a
roadmap for an as-applied uniformity challenge.
1. The Reference to Constitutional Requirements
After determining the section 5000A penalty to be a "tax" for
constitutional purposes, Chief Justice Roberts proceeded to caution:
"Even if the taxing power enables Congress to impose a tax on not
obtaining health insurance, any tax must still comply with other

requirements in the Constitution."82

The plural "requirements" is particularly instructive. The Constitution
places two specific limitations on Congress's taxing power:
apportionment 83 and uniformity. 84 In addition, the General Welfare
81. I.R.C. § 5000A(c)(4)(D) (repealed Mar. 2010).
82. NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2598, 2598 (2012) (emphasis added).
83. Apportionment appears twice in the original U.S. Constitution and twice in
amendments. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl.
3; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 4 ("proportion"); U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, XVI.
84. U.S. CONST. art. 1,§ 8, cl. 1. This applies specifically to duties, excises, and imposts.
Id.Whether it also applies more generally to all indirect taxes is covered below.
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Clause limits Congress's power: "The Congress shall have Power To lay
and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and
provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United
States." Chief Justice Roberts discussed the general welfare limitation
three times. He quoted it as part of Article I, Section 8.85 Later, he twice
described it as a limitation on the Spending Power:
The Spending Clause grants Congress the power "to pay the Debts
86
and provide for the.., general Welfare of the United States."
The conditions imposed by Congress ensure that the funds are used
by the States to "provide for the

manner Congress

....

general Welfare" in the

intended.87

Justice Roberts's discussion of the limitation in relation to spending,
but not in relation to taxing, is at least interesting. It places some context
on his use of the plural term "requirements" in relations to taxing power
limitations. After that general reference to "requirements," the Justice
discussed the application of apportionment
to section 5000A, concluding
88
the requirement does not apply.
Much of the debate surrounding the taxing power implications of the
Affordable Care Act focused on the application of apportionment.
Several prominent academics have insisted that "general welfare" was the
only realistic taxing power limitation. 89 Justice Roberts effectively
dismissed such arguments, and explained that Congress's taxing power
was more limited than merely by that meager requirement: for three pages
he discussed the apportionment requirement.
While one cannot read the Justice's mind, he appeared to be thinking
of apportionment and uniformity. Indeed he spoke at length of
apportionment, but in contrast he mentioned uniformity only in passing.
Nevertheless, he had to know of the historically important
apportionment/uniformity dichotomy of taxes: one for direct and the
other for indirect. Certainly, he spoke extensively of "direct" taxes,
finding that section 5000A was not one. Implicitly, he suggested the
85. NFIB, 132 S.Ct. at 2601.
86. Id.at 2601.
87. Id.at 2602.
88. Id. at 2599.
89. See Calvin H. Johnson, Letter to the Editor, Healthcare Penalty Need Not Be
Apportioned Among the States, TAX NOTES (July 19, 2010) (arguing against apportionment as
relevant for the Affordable Care Act, criticizing Pollock, and arguing the Court should follow
Hylton); Calvin H. Johnson, Commentary, Fixing the Constitutional Absurdity of the
Apportionment ofDirect Tax, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 295, 299 (2004) (arguing apportionment is a
"profound stupidity;" Bruce Ackerman, Taxation and the Constitution,99 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 2
(1999) (arguing that apportionment is "absurd").
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penalty is an indirect tax.
2. The Reference to Pollock
In 1865, the Supreme Court struck down the income tax, finding it an
un-apportioned direct tax. Many commentators conclude the decision
was not only wrong, but that it also no longer applies. 90 Yet, Justice
Roberts did not agree. While his Pollock comments were mostly neutral,
he cited the case as correctly holding an income tax to be a direct tax. 91
Then, in the very next sentence, he concluded that section 5000A is no
form of "recognized category of direct tax. 92 Despite persistent
arguments by academics and brief writers who claimed that section
5000A could be justified as an income tax,93 Justice Roberts
unquestionably disagreed. He resurrected the academic nemesis of
Pollock and relied upon it to say an income tax is a direct tax. He then
boldly held that section 5000A is not a direct tax-or at least not a
recognized one. As such, it cannot be justified under the 16th
Amendment, which removed the apportionment requirement from an
income tax.
While Justice Roberts never described section 5000A as an "indirect"
tax, his persistent references to "direct tax" and his finding that the
section is not direct suggests he viewed it as "indirect" and thus subject
94
to uniformity.

3. The Reliance on Hylton
The most significant evidence of uniformity applying to section
5000A flows from the Court's use of Hylton:95 the earliest Supreme Court
case on Congress's taxing power. Briefs and articles extensively argued
the importance of Hylton;9 6 indeed, proponents of the ACA consistently
90. See Johnson, supra note 89, at 299,348, 351 (arguing Pollock should never be followed
again and instead the Court should return to the Hylton analysis); Ackerman, supra note 89, at 45.
91. NFIB, 132 S.Ct. at 2598.
92. Id.at 2599.
93. Edward D. Kleinbard, ConstitutionalKreplach, Commentary, 128 TAX NOTES 755,
760 (2010).
94. Cf Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 582 (1937) (discussing but dismissing
the idea of another kind of tax); United States v. Ptasynski, 462 U.S. 74, 79, 80, n.9 (1983).
95. Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. 1 (1796).
96. Johnson, supra note 89, at 348; Ackerman, supra note 89, at 1; HHS Reply Brief, for
the Petitioner at 24-25, Department of Health and Human Serv. Petitioners v. State of Florida,
No. 11-398 (11 th Cir. Mar. 7, 2012), at 24-25 (supporting Hylton as authority); David B. Rivkin,
Jr. et al., Debate, A Healthy Debate: The Constitutionalityofan Individual Mandate, 158 U. PENN.

ST. L. REV. 93, 114, 116 (2009).
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cited Hylton in support of its constitutionality.9 7 They did so to support

the notion that apportionment is a very limited requirement that would
not restrict section 5000A. They were apparently concerned with the
apportionment question, but paid little heed to the alternative uniformity
requirement.
Justice Roberts also relied on Hylton-and specifically Justice
Chase's opinion-for what were arguably his most important lines:
A tax on going without health insurance does not fall within any
recognized category of direct tax. It is not a capitation. Capitations
are taxes paid by every person, "without regard to property,
profession, or any other circumstance." Hylton, supra, at 175
(opinion of Chase, J.) (emphasis altered). 98
While out of context, that reference is critical because it stresses the
importance of the Hylton decision. As others have opined, 99 the Hylton
Justices were contemporaries of the constitutional convention delegates
and would have been well aware of the debate on taxing power
limitations.100

Although Justice Roberts's use of Hylton related to apportionment,
the case is informative on another critical issue: uniformity and the
breadth of the taxing power. Three Justices wrote significant opinions in
Hylton. All three opined on the uniformity requirement. Each noted how
the Constitution requires direct taxes to be apportioned and excises,
duties, and imposts to be uniform. Each recognized the list might not
cover the universe of potential taxes: perhaps some other form of tax, as
yet undiscovered, could be possible. If so, must it be apportioned or
uniform, or need it satisfy neither requirement? Justices Iredell and
Patterson were clear: if such a tax is possible, it must be uniform. Justice
Chase was more circumspect: "[i]f there are any other species of taxes
that are not direct, and not included within the words duties, imposts, or
excises, they may be laid by the rule of uniformity, or not; as Congress
97. See Rivkin, Jr. et al., supra note 96, at 116 (2009).
98. NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2598. The Chief Justice did not quote the full
sentence expressed by Justice Chase in his Hylton opinion: "I am inclined to think but of this I do
not give ajudicial opinion, that the direct taxes contemplated by the Constitution, are only two,
to wit, a capitation, or poll tax, simply, without regard to property, profession, or any other
circumstance; and a tax on LAND." Hylton, 3 U.S. Dallat 175 (emphasis added). The omitted
independent clause appears significant as it changes the critical quoted comment "without regard
to any other circumstance" to weak dicta: Justice Chase declined to stand behind the comment as
his judicial opinion. [Author: Need Citel. That this incomplete quotation became the sole cited
authority for not striking the ACA as an un-apportioned direct tax is noteworthy.
99. Ackerman, supra note 89, at 20 (arguing that Hylton was as important as Marbury v.
Madison).
100. Id. at 21. Justices, Chase, Paterson, and Wilson were delegates.
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shall think proper and reasonable."' 0'1
Justice Roberts's reliance on Hylton for such a critical part of his own
opinion suggests he was fully aware of Hylton's significance. That, in
turn, suggests he was aware the tax he described as "no kind of
recognized direct tax" must be something else. He must have known that
"indirect" was not a term used in the Constitution. Thus, he must have
contemplated the issue of whether it need be uniform. Appropriately, his
opinion did not cover the point, as it would be a premature as applied
challenge, albeit an argument raised in at least one amici brief. 0 2 Justice
Roberts's reliance on Hylton suggests agreement with it.
The 1796 Hylton decision was not the only instance that the Supreme
Court discussed the broad application of "uniformity." In 1867, Justice
Chase in the License Tax Cases stated:
It is true that the power of Congress to tax is a very
extensive power. It is given in the Constitution, with only one
exception and only two qualifications. Congress cannot tax
of
exports, and it must impose direct taxes by the rule
03
apportionment, and indirect taxes by the rule of uniformity.1
The broad application of uniformity to "indirect" taxes is reminiscent
of similar language in the Federalist papers. 10 4 Later, in 1910, Justice Day
not only quoted the broad "indirect" language from the License Tax
Cases,"°5 but also added:
The act now under consideration does not impose direct taxation
upon property solely because of its ownership, but the tax is within
the class which Congress is authorized to lay and collect
under Article I, § 8, clause 1 of the Constitution, and described
generally as taxes, duties, imposts and excises, upon which the
limitation is that they shall be uniform throughout the United
06
States. 1
The Court thus applied the uniformity requirement not only to "duties,
imposts and excises," but also to "taxes" generally. The Hylton discussion
of uniformity's reach rested on the Constitution's initial use of the general
term "taxes" and then the later specific terms "duties, imposts and
101. Hylton, 3 Dall. at 173.
102. Brief of Amicus Curiae Tax Foundation and Law Professors in Support of Amici
Curiae Supporting Appellants and Urging Reversal, Apr., 29, at 6-7, United States v. Marshall,
No. 12-20804 (5th Cir. Apr. 29, 2013, 6-7). Brief of Professor Steven Willis.
103. License Tax Cases, 72 U.S. 462, 471 1867) (emphasis added).
104.

THE FEDERALIST No. 36 (Alexander Hamilton).

105. Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107, 153-54 (1910).
106. Id.at 150 (emphasis added).
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excises. ' 17 In 1983, Justice Powell, writing for a unanimous Ptsyanski
Court stated: "Article I, § 9, cl. 4, provides that direct taxes shall be
apportioned among the States by population. Indirect taxes, however, are
subject to the rule of uniformity. See Hylton v. United States, 3 Dall. 171,
176 (1796) (opinion of Paterson, j.).,,108 Thus Justice Roberts's NFIB
reliance on Hylton regarding constitutional tax requirements is consistent
with Supreme Court opinions spanning some 215 years. By not applying
the apportionment requirement to section 5000A, and by limiting the
general welfare requirement to spending, 10 9 Justice Roberts must have
he spoke of the
anticipated a uniformity challenge to section 5000A when
10
tax having to satisfy constitutional "requirements.""
IV. WHETHER THE 5000A is GEOGRAPHICALLY SUSPECT

The general individual mandate tax is a function of the modified
household income of taxpayers who fail to acquire minimum essential
coverage in relation to the nationwide average cost of a bronze plan. "'
That facially satisfies uniformity: although it varies by income, it applies
the same general rate throughout the United States.
But, the low-income taxpayer exception applies a very different rule.
Under subsection (e), taxpayers are not subject to the penalty if the price
of lowest cost availablebronze plan (after application of the section 36B
credit) exceeds 8% of their modified household income. The price of the
plan is a function of the taxpayer's age, household size, and tobacco use,
as well as where the taxpayer resides.
Significantly, the exception goes to the heart of the Affordable Care
Act in that it imposes the tax for low-income persons who might not be
able to afford coverage. The variations under the low-income exception
are partially geographic:
The tax is a function of the bronze plan price where the taxpayer
resides. Such plan prices vary widely within states and among
states.
The tax is a function of the section 36B credit, which varies from
state to state in two aspects: (1) because of varying silver plan
prices, and (2) because of varying poverty lines.

107.
108.
(emphasis
109.
110.
I11.

Hylton, 3 DalI. at 173.
United States v. Ptasynski, 462 U.S. 74 n. 9 (1983) (relying on Paterson, J, in Hylton)
added).
NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2601 (2012).
Id.at 2598.
I.R.C.A. § 5000A(c)(l)(b) (2015).
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These two variations are facially geographic. As such, they prompt
the need for a Ptasynski examination.
V. WHETHER THE SUSPECT SECTIONS PASS A CLOSE
UNIFORMITY ANALYSIS

A. Analysis ofSuspect Issues
The section 5000A tax, ignoring the subsection (e) low-income
exception, is uniform: it is a function of the national average cost of the
cheapest bronze plans in the exchanges. But, the paragraph (e)(1)
exception for "Individuals Who Cannot Afford Coverage" is nonuniform. It exempts anyone whose "required contribution" exceeds 8%112
of his/her modified adjusted gross income [MAGI]. 113 For persons not
eligible for employer sponsored insurance, the required contribution
equals the price of the lowest cost bronze plan available to the person in
his/her own rating area 114 minus the amount of the section 36B credit
allowable." 5 The formula for this is:
B
B
B
B
B
B
B

-

[S [S [S [S [S [S [S -

(F)(MAGI)] >
(F)(MAGI)] >
(F)(MAGI)] >
(F)(MAGI)] >
(F)(MAGI)] >
(F)(MAGI)] >
(F)(MAGI)] >

(.08)(MAGI)
(.08)(MAGI)
(.08)(MAGI)
(.08)(MAGI)
(.08)(MAGI)
(.08)(MAGI)
(.08)(MAGI)

MA4GI = the taxpayer's household "modified adjusted gross
income."
B = the lowest cost Bronze plan available to the taxpayer in his/her
rating area.
S = the second lowest cost Silver plan sold in the taxpayer's rating
area.

F = a factor which varies from .02 to .095. This factor is a function
by the federal poverty
of the taxpayer's household MAGI divided
6
level and a statutory conversion chart."

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

I.R.C.A. § 5000A(e)(I)(A).
I.R.C.A. § 5000A(c)(4)(C).
I.R.C.A. § 5000A(e)(1)(1B)(ii).
Id.
See I.R.S. Table 2, Instructions for Form 8962, Cat. No. 60401R, 5, 8 tbl.2 (Oct. 16,
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The formula varies among the states in three ways:
1. B (lowest cost bronze plan) varies by rating areas within and
among states. Thus, similar taxpayers have different B's solely
because of their state of residence.
2. S (second lowest cost silver plan) varies by rating areas within and
among states. Thus, similar taxpayers have different S's solely
because of their state of residence.
3. F (poverty-level factor) is uniform among the "lower 48" states,
but differs in both Alaska and Hawaii. Thus, similar taxpayers
have different F's solely because they reside either in Alaska,
Hawaii, or in the lower 48.
Facially, subsection 5000A(e) does not appear uniform: the three
state-to-state variables are purely geographic. As explained earlier,
however, a facial challenge to subsection 5000A(e) is unlikely to be
successful; instead, a successful challenge must be as-applied, which
requires a plaintiff to demonstrate he/she is liable for the tax solely
because of the state in which he/she resides.
An ideal plaintiff would be able to demonstrate that moving to a
neighboring county in another state' 17 would cause him/her to escape the
penalty. Ideally, such neighboring counties would be geographically and
demographically similar, so as to avoid any Ptasynski/Mellon/Regional
Rail argument: Congress may violate uniformity to correct isolated
regional problems. Such ideal examples abound, at least hypothetically.

B. Hypothetical Non-Diverse, Non-Isolated, Non-Uniform Taxpayers
Example One
Posit two Taxpayers, each aged 60, unmarried, and with no
dependents. Each has $65,000 MAGI, neither is eligible for an employersponsored plan or any exemption other than possibly the section
5000A(e) low-income exemption, neither uses tobacco, and neither had
minimum essential coverage during 2014. One resides in Cleburne
2015).
117. A lack of uniformity within a single state would also arguably violate uniformity;
however, lack of uniformity between states presents a stronger case. Non-uniformity within a state
could arguably be justified because of "diverse" or "isolated" conditions between rural and urban
areas. In contrast, non-uniformity between states is much more difficult to justify or excuse when
the only distinction is the state political boundary.
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County, Alabama and the other in Haralson County, Georgia.
The Alabama taxpayer would be subject to a $95 tax for failure to have
health insurance. The 2014 lowest priced Cleburne County"' Bronze
plan cost $401.67 per month. Because the taxpayer's income exceeded
400% of the $11,490 poverty level, he/she would not have received a
section 36B credit." 9 Because the lowest priced 2014 Bronze plan cost
less than $433.33 (8% of the taxpayer's monthly income), the Alabama
taxpayer would not be eligible for the section 5000A(e) exemption and
thus would owe the tax.
In contrast, the Georgia taxpayer would not be subject to the tax. The
2014 lowest priced Haralson County 120 Bronze plan cost $455 per month.
Because the taxpayer's income exceeded 400% of the $11,490 poverty
level, he/she would not have received a section 36B credit. Because the
lowest priced 2014 Bronze plan cost more than $433.33 (8% of the
taxpayer's monthly income), the Georgia taxpayer would be eligible for
the section 5000A(e) exemption and thus would owe no tax.
If the Alabama taxpayer moved one mile to the east along U.S.
Highway 78, he/she could escape the tax. The two counties appear
geographically identical and demographically very similar, mooting an
"isolated problems" exception. Both Cleburne and Haralson counties are
in the southern part of the Blue Ridge Mountains. Cleburne had a 2010
21
population of 14,972 with a density of 26 persons per square mile.'
Haralson had a 2010 population of 28,780 with a density of 102.122
Cleburne had a median age of 4141123 while Haralson had a median age
of 39. 124 The two counties have similar demographic make-ups in terms
of average income, racial diversity, and percentage of households below
the poverty level.125 Although Haralson is more densely populated, both
118.

Health Coverage Tax Tool, supra note 72, at Zip Code 36269. The federal government

operates a web site that determines the "lowest cost bronze plan" available for each state by zip
code. Id.
119. I.R.C.A.

120.

§ 36B(b)(3)(A)(i).

Zip Code 30176.

121. State & Cleburne County, Alabama, QuickFacts,U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Dec. 02,2015,
9:51 AM), http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/01/01029.hml.
122. State & HaralsonCounty, Georgia,QuickFacts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Dec. 02,2015,
9:53 AM), http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/13/13143.html.
123. Cleburne County, Alabama, American FactFinder, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,

http://factfinder.census.gov/faces/navnavtableservices/jsf/pages/community
ew.xhtml# (last visited Jan. 29, 2016).
124.

Haralson County,

Georgia, American

FactFinder, U.S.

factsfactsproductvi
CENSUS

BUREAU,

http://factfinder.census.gov/faces/navnavtableservices/jsf/pages/communityfactsfactsproductvi
ew.xhtml# (last visited Jan. 29, 2016).
125.

Compare Cleburne County, Alabama, American FactFinder,U.S. CENsus BUREAU,

http://factfinder.census.gov/faces/navnavtableservices/j sf/pages/communityfactsfactsproductvi
ew.xhtml (last visited Jan. 29, 2016) ), with Haralson County, Georgia, American FactFinder,
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://factfinder.census.gov/faces/navnavtableservices/jsf/pages/communi
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are predominantly rural. The only important difference between the two
is the state political boundary.

Example Two
Posit three Taxpayers, each aged 60, unmarried, and with no
dependents. Each has MAGI of $50,000, none is eligible for an employersponsored plan or any exemption other than possibly the section
5000A(e) low-income exemption, none uses tobacco, and none had
minimum essential coverage during 2014. One resides in Miami,
Oklahoma, another in Joplin, Missouri, and the third in Galena, Kansas.
The Oklahoma taxpayer would owe the tax, 2 6 but the taxpayers in
both Kansas 127 and Missouri 128 would escape'it. The Oklahoma taxpayer
could escape the tax by merely moving 20 miles to the north into Kansas
or 28 miles to the northeast into Missouri. Demographically, the three
counties are similar, with Jasper County Missouri (Joplin) being the most
prosperous. Ottawa County, Oklahoma, has a noticeably higher
population of Native Americans, arguably a favored group in a
Ptasynski/Mellon/RegionalRail analysis; however, Ottawa residents are
more likely subject to the tax than those in the more prosperous Jasper
County. Hence, no apparent reason exists for Congress wishing to tax
Oklahoma residents as compared to those of Kansas and Missouri.
tyfacts.xhtml#factsproductview.xhtml# (last visited Jan. 29, 2016).
126. Health Coverage Tax Tool, supra note 72, at Zip Code 74354. In Miami, Oklahoma,
the cheapest 2014 Bronze Plan cost $305.69, which is less than 8% of the taxpayer's MAGI
($333.33), thus trigging the tax. Health Coverage Tax Tool, supra note 72.
127. Health Coverage Tax Tool, supra note 72, at Zip Code 66739. In Galena, Kansas, the
cheapest 2014 Bronze Plan cost $410.66, which exceeds 8% of the taxpayer's MAGI ($333.33),
thus trigging the tax exemption. Healthcare.gov, supra note 72.
128. Health Coverage Tax Tool, supra note 72, at Zip Codes 64801, 64804. In Joplin,
Missouri, the cheapest 2014 Bronze Plan cost $421.14, which exceeds 8% of the taxpayer's MAGI
($333.33), thus trigging the tax exemption. Healthcare.gov, supra note 72.
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Similarly, if the hypothetical taxpayer had income of $62,000, he
would be subject to the tax if he lived in Galena, Kansas, but not subject
to the tax if he moved four miles to the east and resided in Joplin,
Missouri. Again, no apparent reason exists to favor residents of Joplin,
Missouri over those who reside a few miles to the west across the Kansas
state line.
Example Three
Posit two Taxpayers, each aged 60, unmarried, and with no
dependents. Each has $55,000 MAGI, neither is eligible for an employersponsored plan or any exemption other than possibly the section
5000A(e) low-income exemption, neither uses tobacco, and neither had
minimum essential coverage during 2014. One resides in Neah Bay,
Washington (Clallam County), and the other in Ketchikan, Alaska
(Ketchikan Gateway Borough).
The Alaska taxpayer would be subject to a $95 tax for failure to have
health insurance. The 2014 lowest priced Ketchikan Borough 129 Bronze
plan cost $658 per month. Because the taxpayer's income did not exceed
400% of the $14,580 poverty level, he/she would have received a section

129. Health Coverage Tax Tool, supra note 72, at Zip Code 36269. The federal government
operates a web site that determines the "lowest cost bronze plan" available for each state by zip
code. Health Coverage Tax Tool, supra note 72.
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36B credit.130 The credit would have been $430 per month ($865 [the cost
of the second lowest priced silver plan] minus 9.5% of the $55,000
MAGI). The net would have been $228, which is less than $366.66 (8%
of the taxpayer's monthly income). The Alaska taxpayer would not be
eligible for the section 5000A(e) exemption and thus would owe the tax.
In contrast, the Washington taxpayer would not be subject to the tax.
-- ----.
The 2014 lowest priced
Clallam County 1 3 ' Bronze
tr.4. '..*
plan cost $491.71 per
the
Because
month.
OKethikanAK
rf,
.
taxpayer's
income

IIt
...

.exceeded

400% of the
$11,490 poverty level, he or

1

she would not have
received a section 36B
credit. Because the lowest
priced 2014 Bronze plan

,

rcost
NWA

i

more than $366.66

of the taxpayer's
(8%
monthly
income),
the
I Washington
taxpayer
would be eligible for the
section
5000A(e)

exemption and thus would owe no tax.
The two localities are both fairly rural, although Neah Bay,
Washington has a significantly higher population. 32 They are 831 miles
apart; however, they are about as close as any habitable point in Alaska
is to a "lower 48" state. Same aged taxpayer, same family status, same
income, but the Alaska taxpayer would owe the tax and the Washington
taxpayer would not. The difference is the eligibility of the Alaska
taxpayer for the section 38B credit. This results because the federal
poverty level 33for Alaska is greater than the federal poverty level for
Washington.

130. See King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2494-95 (2015) (holding the I.R.C. section 36B
credits apply both in state and federally created exchanges).
131. Health Coverage Tax Tool, supra note 72, at Zip Code 30176. The federal government
operates a web site that determines the "lowest cost bronze plan" available for each state by zip
code. Id.
132.

Compare Clallum County, Washington, QuickFacts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Feb. 1,

2016, 9:00 PM), http://quickfacts.census.gov/ qfd/states/53/53009.html, with Ketchikan Gateway
Borough, Alaska, QuickFacts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Feb. 1, 2016, 9:00 PM),
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/02/02130.html.
133. See supra text accompanying note 13.
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C. Conclusionson Uniformity
The section 5000A(e) low-income exception cannot satisfy an asapplied uniformity challenge for the year 2014. The tax applies to the
failure to purchase a product that is essentially the same product in each
state. The only important difference between the hypothetical Alabama
taxpayer and the hypothetical Georgia taxpayer is the arbitrary political
state boundary. The two bronze plans the hypothetical taxpayers fail to
purchase are not akin to different kinds of oil, as in Ptasynski; instead,
they are effectively the same plan providing "minimum essential
coverage." The two counties do not have any apparent unique or isolated
problems Congress appears to have been addressing, per the test in
Blanchette. The two counties also do not present any apparent "diverse"
conditions justifying a lack of uniformity, as approved in Florida v.
Mellon.
The strongest argument favoring the ACA against a uniformity
challenge centers on Florida v. Mellon, which upheld the estate tax
despite its more favorable treatment of taxpayers in states with
inheritance tax as compared to states without such taxes. The Court
dismissed the challenge on procedural grounds, but strongly suggested
Florida had made its own decision not to have an inheritance tax and thus
created the diverse conditions resulting in a lack of uniformity.

34

Arguably, that is true of all fifty states that chose to regulate health
insurance. All states, with the few recent exceptions attempting state
compacts for health insurance,1 35 regulate insurance differently.
Arguably, that makes the bronze plans in each state sufficiently different
to justify a Ptasynski analysis. More significantly, that lack of uniformity
is the choice all fifty states have made.
But, unlike the state constitutional provision in Floridav. Mellon that
precluded an inheritance tax, the state-by-state regulation of insurance is
something Congress created. In response to South-Eastern Underwriters
Association,'36 in which the court held insurance to be "commerce,"
Congress in 1945 enacted the MaCarran-Fergeson Act' 37 exempting
insurance from significant federal regulation. Repeated attempts to repeal
MaCalTan-Fergeson have failed. For Congress to justify the lack of ACA
uniformity on its own legislation is plausible-all fifty states have taken
134. Floridav. Mellon, 273 U.S. 12, at 17 (1927).
135. Diane Stafford, 9 States Sign Compact to Run Health Care without Congress,
GOVERNING (Aug. 28, 2014), http://www.goveming. com/news/headlines/mct-state-health-

compact.html;; States Consider Health Compacts to Challenge Federal PPACA, NATIONAL
CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Dec. 1, 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/states-

pursue-health-compacts.aspx..
136. United States v. Se. Underwriters Assoc., 332 U.S. 533 (1944).
137. McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (2012).
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advantage of that legislation. However, it seems at best disingenuous.
Still, the MaCarran-Fergeson defense, even if valid, does not justify
the lack of uniformity between southeast Alaska and northwest
Washington-two fairly similar places. That lack of uniformity has no
possible Floridav. Mellon defense because it results from the federally
mandated choice to distinguish poverty levels in Alaska and Hawaii as
compared to the other states.
VI. CONGRESS OR THE STATES CAN REMEDY THE
UNIFORMITY PROBLEMS

Although a constitutional requirement, uniformity (or the lack
thereof) has statutory solutions.
Congress could amend section 5000A(e) to make it a function of the
nationwide bronze average-rather than the cost of the plan where the
taxpayer lives-which would moot all problems other than those
involving Alaska or Hawaii.
States could form compacts for the interstate sale of health insurance
and rating areas that cross state lines. 13 8 That could result in counties such
as Cleburne and Haralson being in the same exchange rating area despite
being in different states. 139 Or, Congress could repeal MaCarran-

Fergeson. Or, Congress could expand the provision for nationwide
plans 140 and eliminate the current state opt-out for such plans.
Congress could change the poverty distinctions for Alaska and
Hawaii. This would be a necessary change, along with one of the above.
VII. CONCLUSION

Justice Roberts's NFIB opinion upheld the ACA as a tax in 2012.
Congress, as a result, has had the opportunity to cure the foreseeable
uniformity problem. It did not do so for 2014; hence, the ACA is subject
to a successful uniformity challenge for that year. Based on announced
2015 rates, a similarly successful uniformity challenge is plausible. The
constitutional uniformity problem is serious, but presents procedural
problems because of its annual nature. It is necessarily an "as applied"
138. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), Pub. L. No. 111-148, §
1333(a), 124 Stat. 119, 206-07 (2010). Id. at 221.
139. See 15 U.S.C. § 1012. The McCarran-Ferguson Act of 1945 granted states the right to
regulate health insurance within their borders; see PPACA, supra note 138, at 119, 206-08. The
ACA in section 1333 granted states the power to form interstate compacts for the sale of health
insurance. Id. at 206-08.
140. See PPACA, supra note 138, at 207-08.
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challenge and is subject to simple legislative solutions, although they may
be politically difficult.

